Arguing About Gods, Graham Oppy, Cambridge University Press, 2006 (ISBN 0-521-86386-4), xix + 449 pp.
Oppy’s newest book, Arguing About Gods, is essential for those interested in the Philosophy of Religion, Natural Theology, and the existence of God. It represents significant research and a robust acquaintance with contemporary and classical work about the existence of God. In an important way, this book is a modern day application of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, which Oppy refers to as one of his favorites. While many defenses have been given in reply to Hume, what Oppy shows in his work is that these have failed to successfully modify the classical theistic arguments. Oppy applies Hume’s method to post-Humean modifications of theistic arguments, and exhibits the same rigorous skepticism as the interlocutor Philo from Dialogues. Through an analysis of Oppy’s criticism and application of Hume, it can be understood that there are two reasons why post-Humean theists have not successfully responded to Hume (and why pre-Humean theists were unable to give a ‘Hume proof’ argument). These will become evident as Oppy’s criticisms are considered, as will a possible avenue for a successful proof, and the necessity of a proof for Christianity. The centrality of a proof, especially for Christianity, is based on the ought/can principle, making the need to show the clarity of God’s existence foundational to any other aspect of the Christian gospel.
First Published: Stanford University Press – Experience Without Qualities By Elizabeth Goodstein Review
Goodstein provides a fascinating study of boredom as a phenomenon in the contemporary world and traces related concepts, such as malaise, ennui, melancholy, and acedia. She ties together threads from philosophy, history, religion, and the arts to absorb her audience in the problem of boredom. She argues that the ‘rise of the discourse on boredom is a symptom of the dissolution of the ‘intact sensibility’ in modernity’(p. 398). She believes that boredom is a form of reflective consciousness that is part of a distinctly modern rhetoric about subjective malaise (p. 399).Relying on a dialectical understanding of historical development to provide the structure of her analysis, she believes that boredom cannot be identified with the older conditions of melancholy or acedia because the failures of the Enlightenment era have left modern humanity in a uniquely reflective position. Specifically, the traditional frameworks of meaning have failed and left a ‘hollow emptiness of self’ (p. 398). This cannot be equated with cynicism, but is related to a kind of skepticism that results from the failure of the Enlightenment claims about reason to produce meaning.