I will be giving a talk this spring about the question: “What has Jerusalem to do with Athens.” As part of the talk, I will discuss the Academy in Athens. I make this part of my analysis of early Princeton in my book: Faith and Reason at Early Princeton. There I draw the analogy between the founding of the Academy and the founding of Princeton, and the ruins of the Academy in which Cicero lectured and the postmodern Academy of today.
Cicero divided the history of the Academy into two parts, the Old Academy and the New Academy. Others might find three or four. I rely on his analysis for our purposes here. The Academy began with Socrates and his Socratic method of questioning. Socrates knew that he did not know, but he did want to know. He wanted to be wise and did not want to be like those who thought they were wise when they were not.
To this Socratic method, Plato added mythological and metaphysical speculation. The Old Academy continued the work of Plato and became involved increasingly in burdensome and speculative theories about the nature of the forms and mathematics. This was far from any standard set by Socrates for seeking knowledge.
The New Academy was reacting to this metaphysical speculation and wanted to return to the Socratic method. However, to this original method was added the claim that knowledge is not possible. Instead, the Socratic method was used to criticize other philosophies, especially the Stoics. Perhaps the Stoics invited this with their belief that all is eternal and their adherence to the eternal return (made popular again in our time by Nietzsche).
This form of skepticism came to be called Academic Skepticism. It is different than the original Socratic doubt. Socrates doubted some things but he did not doubt everything (as is evident in The Apology). Radical doubt is when even the necessary conditions for doubt are doubted.
The Academic Skeptics did not follow their radical doubt consistently but instead affirmed the ability to know probabilities and maintain practical ends. This move to pragmatism is a move to the non-cognitive. It is the move to power and we see it also in our day both in Nietzsche and his disciple Foucault. Instead of analyzing beliefs as either meaningful/meaningless, and true/false, they are analyzed in terms of “what works.” The problem is that what works, or satisfies, is a statement about the speaker and other belief commitments they have and not about what is real or true.
We can also see this move to the non-cognitive in the move to mysticism which is a replacement of true/false with acquaintance and relation. The mystics “know” by acquaintance with the highest being and this relational experience is not analyzed for meaning or truth content. Once it is analyzed in that way we enter into the area of belief formation and reason. Both pragmatism and mysticism set aside the analysis of thought and reason and instead use non-rational categories.
Radical doubt will often use either pragmatic or mystical categories to critique the cognitive category of thought and the source of thought in reason. However, this is a category mistake. The mystic and the pragmatist either must remain in their non-cognitive category or if they begin forming beliefs about the non-cognitive they have entered into the area of rationality and thought. While reason as the laws of thought might not apply to the non-cognitive mystical area, it does apply to any thoughts about the mystical.
An example of this more consistent form of skepticism was the school of the Pyrrhonians. This school practiced radical doubt by abstaining from affirming any beliefs whatsoever (remember the Academic Skeptics tried to maintain pragmatic beliefs based on probabilities). Even the principle of radical doubt was itself subject to doubt. This school was consistent in seeing that if one holds to radical doubt then one cannot form any belief. This is the move to silence. “About that belief I make no comment (silence).”
In attempting to maintain pragmatic beliefs the Academic Skeptics relied on probability. However, probabilities require knowns. If nothing can be known then there can be no probabilities. Instead, probabilities become plausibilities, or statements about what seems likely to me. So that this or that will work is a statement about what I think is likely to satisfy me. This is both subjective and possibly false. That is, it is a statement about my own thoughts and I have no sufficient reason to think I am correct. There is no reason for the rest of us to listen to this. The Pyrrhonian was more consistent in withholding belief.
Later, in what we could call the founding of the Modern Academy, Descartes also begins with doubt. Like Socrates, he doubts what can be doubted with the goal of finding what can be known. He considers radical doubt in the form of his demon. The Cartesian demon might be tricking him about everything and he looks for what it is that even this demon can’t doubt. He sought for what is clear and that is commendable. Where he came short in finding what is clear helps explain the trajectory of the Academy since his time and the postmodern condition we are in now.
Radical doubt as demonic doubt was present from the beginning. It is there in the original temptation to doubt God. “Did God really say you must not eat? This is just because God knows you will be like Him.” Or, “you should doubt that there is a difference between a and non-a, between God and non-God. Perhaps you (the temporal) can be God (the eternal).” One cannot have a conversation with a demon but must instead affirm what is clear to reason.
Radical doubt is lost in self-referential absurdity. It doubts the very laws of thought (reason) necessary for doubt. It attempts to criticize others but on what basis? Its doubts are non-doubts. Its statements are non-statements. The Cartesian demon can make noises but not coherent sentences. Sam and Dean may not be able to save you from this demon but reason can.
This returns us to the mission of Socrates and the original question of what has Jerusalem to do with Athens. In The Apology, Socrates wants to know who is wise. In Proverbs, we are told to get wisdom. We are told to value it above all else. And we are told that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. There are some things we cannot doubt because they make doubting possible.
Like Cicero we may be lecturing in the ruins of the Academy. If we want to renew philosophy so that it does not go through another similar cycle, we will have to find that lasting foundation for knowledge. Some things are clear to reason.